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All the Supreme Court Really Needs




It is accepted wisdom among constitutional law scholars that
the Supreme Court is now considerably more conservative than it was
during the tenure of Chief Justice Earl Warren. In this Article, I hope
to suggest that the conventional wisdom is at least partly wrong. In
Part I, I suggest that many of the current Court's so-called conserva-
tive cases and doctrines are direct descendants of Warren Court cases
and doctrines. Although my attribution of similarity is new, the de-
scription of the cases and doctrines themselves is entirely unoriginal.
Indeed, the history of the two sets of cases-of the Warren Court and
the current Court-could be drawn from almost any basic textbook in
constitutional law. The interesting question, then, is why the obvious
parallels have escaped most observers. In Part II, I explore why we
cling to the myth that the current Court is much more conservative
than its predecessor.
I begin with two definitional caveats. To canvas the entire
scope of the Warren Court---or of the current Court, for that mat-
ter-would be a massive task. Instead, I will limit this Article to a
few salient areas of law. The Warren Court is known primarily for its
championship of individual liberty and racial equality. Even much of
the vaunted "Due Process Revolution"-enlarging the rights of both
criminal defendants and civil litigants-found its genesis in racial
equality.1 The Equal Protection Clause was the centerpiece of the
* Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law, University of
Minnesota. I would like to thank Paul Edelman and Daniel Farber for their comments on
earlier drafts of this Article. Kaitlin Hallet provided excellent research assistance. I am also
grateful to my commentators, Rebecca Brown, Barry Friedman, and John Goldberg, for
challenging me and forcing me to hone and strengthen my arguments.
1. See generally Fred P. Graham, The Self-Inflicted Wound 27-66 (Macmillan, 1970)
(discussing the impact of racial equality on the "Due Process Revolution"); Charles Whitebread
and Christopher Slobogin, Criminal Procedure: An Analysis of Cases and Concepts (Foundation
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Court's equality jurisprudence. The paradigmatic protection of indi-
vidual liberty is the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment,
which first received its most expansive interpretations at the hands of
the Warren Court. Thus, I will focus on the jurisprudence of those
two clauses.
There is also the question of timing. Earl Warren retired in
1969, but for purposes of examining the "liberal" jurisprudence of the
Warren Court, Warren's actual tenure is not wholly relevant. After
all, both Roe v. Wade2 and the cases extending heightened scrutiny to
gender discrimination3-key liberal holdings-were decided after
Warren Burger became Chief Justice. And of the Justices still on the
Court, the conservative Rehnquist was appointed in 1972 and the
liberal Stevens in 1975, so things must still have been in flux at that
time. Thus, although I will focus primarily on cases decided between
1954 and 1969, I will include a few cases up through 1976-trying
always to pick cases that continued earlier trends, and examining




1. The Current Court
The current Court's controversial equal protection cases hardly
need reviewing, but a brief summary is in order. The Court has been
most loudly denounced as conservative for its decisions on two con-
temporary issues: affirmative action and the creation of unusually
Press, 1986); Mark Tushnet, ed., The Warren Court in Historical and Political Perspective (U. of
Virginia, 1993); Barry Feld, Bad Kids (forthcoming 1997); Robert Jerome Glennon, The
Jurisdictional Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 869, 884-928 (1994)
(examining the expansion of federal court review of state actions under the Warren Court).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. See, for example, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (Brennan, J.) ('To withstand
constitutional challenge ... classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of these objectives."); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) ('[C]lassifications based upon sex, like classifications
based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.").
460 [Vol. 50:459
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shaped legislative districts in order to increase minority representa-
tion.
In a pair of recent cases, the Supreme Court held that racial
discrimination is equally constitutionally suspect whether it is di-
rected against whites or against people of color. "[T]he standard of
review under the Equal Protection Clause," the Court wrote in City of
Richmond v. Croson Co.4 and reiterated six years later in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,5 "is not dependent on the race of those bur-
dened or benefited by a particular classification."6 This even-hand-
edness is demanded, according to Justice O'Connor's majority opinion
in Adarand, by the "basic principle" that the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments "protect persons, not groups."7 And it is consonant with
the Constitution's underlying aspiration toward "a Nation of equal
citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity
and achievement."8  Noting "the sorry history of both private and
public discrimination in this country,"9 the Court nevertheless re-
quired race-neutral responses in all but the rarest circumstances.
Otherwise, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his Croson concurrence,
we risk making the problem worse:
The difficulty of overcoming the effects of past discrimination is as nothing
compared with the difficulty of eradicating from our society the source of those
effects, which is the tendency-fatal to a Nation such as ours-to classify and
judge men and women on the basis of their country of origin or the color of
their skin. A solution to the first problem that aggravates the second is no so-
lution at all.10
Whether or not we agree with the decisions in Croson and Adarand,
they clearly rest on an underlying model of evenhandedness and
colorblindness.
In 1993, in Shaw v. Reno," the Court extended a modified
principle of colorblindness to legislative redistricting. In Shaw, the
Court struck down North Carolina's attempt to create a second
"majority-minority" district in the state. Citing Croson, Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion held that "racial gerrymandering" was
subject to the same high level of scrutiny regardless of whether it
4. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
5. 115 S. Ct. 2097, 132 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1995).
6. 115 S. Ct. at 2111 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 494).
7. Id. at 2112.
8. Croson, 488 U.S. at 505-06.
9. Id. at 499.
10. Id. at 520-21 (Scalia, J., concurring).
11. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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favored whites or blacks. 12 Indeed, the cases on which the Court
relied to conclude that North Carolina had engaged in racial
gerrymandering, and that racial gerrymandering violated the
Constitution, had all involved attempts to reduce the voting power of
African Americans.' 3 Although the Court recognized that redistricting
poses special problems-and thus that determining when racial
gerrymandering has occurred can be difficult-it held unequivocally
that the practice cannot constitutionally be used even to increase
black voting power. 14 In subsequent cases, the Court has applied
Shaw to strike down other majority-minority districts. 15
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Croson, castigated the Court
for ignoring its own prior decisions and for "sound[ing] a full-scale
retreat from the Court's longstanding solicitude toward race-conscious
remedial efforts .... 16 Justice White, dissenting in Shaw, accused
the majority of "sidestep [ping]" earlier precedent.' 7 We can quibble
over whether the fractured Courts that decided Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,'8 and Fullilove v. Klutznick,' 9 and
United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey,2o can be
meaningfully interpreted as evidencing much solicitude toward race-
conscious remedies. But the more important point for present
purposes is that Croson, Adarand, Shaw, and the other redistricting
cases in fact represent a return to the defining principles of the
Warren Court, from which some intervening decisions might have
strayed. Far from a conservative betrayal of Warren Court
12. Id. at 657-58.
13. Id. at 643-49 (citing Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S.
55 (1980); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)).
14. Shaw, 509 at 657-58.
15. See, for example, Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1953, 135 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1996); Miller
v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2490, 132 L. Ed. 2d 762 (1995).
16. Croson, 488 U.S. at 561 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
17. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 659.
18. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Bakke, a divided court struck down the University's
affirmative action plan but five justices, in two separate opinions, indicated that a less rigid
affirmative action plan would be constitutional. There was no majority opinion.
19. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). In Fullilove, a divided Court upheld a federal affirmative action
set-aside plan. There was no majority opinion, and the two groups that combined to form a
majority to uphold the program could not agree on a rationale. Three justices, including Justice
Stevens, who seems to have changed his mind, dissented.
20. 430 U.S. 144 (1977). Cited by Justice White in his Shaw dissent, 509 U.S. at 658,
Carey upheld a redistricting plan that deliberately increased black representation at the
expense of the Hasidic Jewish community in New York City. 430 U.S. at 167-68. The Justices
in the majority could not agree on a rationale, and there was no majority opinion. Three
separate opinions purported to explain the ruling.
462 [Vol. 50:459
ALL THE COURT NEEDS TO KNOW
jurisprudence, the most recent affirmative action and redistricting
cases reflect a straightforward application of Warren Court doctrines.
2. The Warren Court
The Warren Court is most famous, and deservedly so, for its
championship of racial justice. While its free speech jurisprudence
might be seen as the realization of aspirations expressed-and occa-
sionally implemented-by previous Courts, its rulings on race were
without precedent. In Brown v. Board of Education,21 Loving v.
Virginia,2 and Gomillion v. Lightfoot,23 the Court turned its back on a
century of Court complicity in racial discrimination and demanded
better from itself and from the citizenry. And the principles it
announced and implemented in those and other cases are the same
principles that underlie the current Court's affirmative action and
redistricting cases.
It hardly needs stating that a key principle underlying the
Warren Court's race cases is that of colorblindness. Race, according
to the Court, is simply not an appropriate basis of classification. In
Brown of course, the Court declared that education "must be made
available to all on equal terms. 24  Whatever may be said of the
Court's reasoning that separate educational facilities violate this
principle, the analysis must begin with an assumption that racial
inequalities violate the Constitution. Thus, although Brown
notoriously failed to articulate an underlying principle, later cases
stressed the invidiousness of racial classifications. As the Court noted
in Loving, "'distinctions between citizens solely because of their
ancestry' [are] 'odious to a free people whose institutions are founded
upon the doctrine of equality.' "25
While the Court never explicitly adopted a principle of
colorblindness or government neutrality in racial matters, the
principle makes sense of otherwise inexplicable cases. Certainly a
principle of colorblindness can explain Brown and Loving. But it can
also explain cases in which the Court failed to find an equal
protection violation. For example, the Court consistently held that
only intentional discrimination violates the Constitution. Beginning
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
23. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
24. 347 U.S. at 493.
25. 388 U.S. at 11 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
1997] 463
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with Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections26 in 1959, the
Court repeatedly refused to invalidate facially neutral statutes with a
disparate impact. In Lassiter, a unanimous Court upheld a racially
neutral literacy test for voting. Justice Douglas's opinion for the
Court suggested that only literacy tests actually "employed to
perpetuate"27 race discrimination would be unconstitutional. Thus,
according to the Warren Court, as long as both a statute and its
purpose are racially neutral, the statute does not violate the
Constitution.
Indeed, in an early Burger Court case, the Court upheld a
facially neutral statute that was arguably motivated by discrimina-
tion. In Palmer v. Thompson,28 the Court upheld the closing of all
municipal swimming pools, despite claims that the city had closed the
pools in order to avoid integrating them. Justice Black's majority
opinion stressed that this was "not a case where whites are permitted
to use public facilities while blacks are denied access," nor one "where
a city is maintaining different sets of facilities for blacks and
whites," 29 highlighting the conclusion that colorblindness is the op-
erative principle for equal protection law. Similarly, in the school
desegregation cases, the Court focused on the difference between de
jure and de facto segregation, demanding remedies only for the for-
mer. The busing cases confirm that, like the modern Court, the older
Court allowed racial classifications only where necessary to remedy
previous violations of the Equal Protection Clause. So firm was this
commitment that the Court occasionally stretched to find a previous
violation, indulging in weak reasoning in order to justify busing
remedies without abandoning the requirement that the segregation be
due to prior unlawful acts.30
The use of a racial neutrality principle in equal protection
cases may be profitably compared with the Warren Court's rather
different course in religious freedom cases. Beginning in 1963, in
Sherbert v. Verner,31 the Court adopted a principle of more substan-
tive equality in interpreting the Free Exercise Clause. When a neu-
tral government policy has a disparate impact on a racial minority,
26. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
27. Id. at 53.
28. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
29. Id. at 220.
30. See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1049,
1099-1101 (1978) (discussing the Warren Court's strained efforts to "tie the condition of segre-
gation to [an] identified violation" of equal protection).
31. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
464 [Vol. 50:459
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standard equal protection doctrine nevertheless permits that policy.
When a neutral government policy has a detrimental impact on the
exercise of a religious belief, by contrast, the Warren Court required
the government to prove a compelling interest in applying the law to
those whose religious beliefs were compromised.32 Whatever the
merits of this doctrine, which has since been overruled, 33 the Court's
failure to extend it to race discrimination nicely illustrates the opera-
tion of the formal neutrality or colorblindness principle in equal
protection law.
Nor do the similarities between the Warren Court and the
current Court stop with the racial neutrality principle itself. In
Gomillion, the Warren Court invalidated an attempt at racial
gerrymandering. Faced with an "uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure,"3
4
the Court did exactly what the later Court would do with North
Carolina's "bug splattered on a windshield":35 it struck down the new
district, finding the evidence "tantamount for all practical purposes to
a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned
with segregating white and colored voters .... 36
The Warren Court also recognized that the Constitution is only
concerned with formal discrimination by the government. Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education37 is often considered one of
the most aggressively liberal of the post-Brown busing cases. In that
case, Chief Justice Burger's opinion for a unanimous Court stated
that the Court was concerned only with "the elimination of the dis-
crimination inherent in the dual school systems, not with the myriad
factors of human existence which can cause discrimination in a multi-
tude of ways on racial, religious, or ethnic grounds."38 In the school
desegregation cases, Burger continued, the Court's objective "does not
and cannot embrace all the problems of racial prejudice, even when
32. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
33. See Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment did not
prohibit Oregon from including religiously inspired peyote ingestion within the reach of its
general criminal prohibition on use of that drug). Congress has in turn reinstated the Sherbert
rule. See the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994
ed.). The question of the constitutionality of RFRA is currently before the Supreme Court. See
Flores v. Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 293, 136 L. Ed. 2d 212
(1996).
34. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340.
35. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 635. This language actually referred to the majority-minority
district not invalidated by the Court; the Court described the district it did invalidate as "even
more unusually shaped." Id.
36. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341.
37. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
38. Id. at 22.
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those problems contribute to disproportionate racial concentrations in
some schools." 9 This insistence on remedying only discrimination
dovetails nicely with the Croson Court's holding that only prior official
discrimination will justify affirmative action, for the sole focus of the
Equal Protection Clause is discrimination, not numerically dispropor-
tionate results.
The principle of racial neutrality is put to its hardest test in
cases challenging affirmative action. While there is nothing that can
justify government discrimination against racial minorities, govern-
ment discrimination in favor of racial minorities raises different ques-
tions. As I will discuss in more detail below, affirmative action pits
formal neutrality or colorblindness against a more substantive con-
ception of equality. A Court that forbids segregated schools on the
basis of substantive equality can comfortably uphold affirmative
action programs with little additional analysis. For a Court
committed to formal neutrality or colorblindness, however, a decision
to uphold affirmative action takes some sophisticated justification.
Had the Warren Court ever decided a case challenging affirmative
action, the resulting opinion-whichever way it went-would provide
strong evidence as to whether that Court was committed to formal or
substantive principles of neutrality.
Although the Warren Court never faced a case challenging
affirmative action under the Equal Protection Clause, the Burger
Court confronted such a case in 1973. In DeFunis v. Odegaard,40 a
disappointed white applicant to the University of Washington Law
School challenged the school's policy of evaluating white and minority
applicants using different standards. Although a majority of the
Court sidestepped the question on technical jurisdictional grounds,
Justice Douglas dissented from that holding and insisted on reaching
the merits. Because Justice Douglas was perhaps the most
consistently liberal member of the Warren Court, his views on
affirmative action are particularly noteworthy. In his DeFunis
dissent, Douglas adhered to principles of formal neutrality, squarely
concluding that affirmative action violated the Equal Protection
Clause. In so doing, he drew on all the precedent of the Warren
Court. He interpreted "the point at the heart of all our school
desegregation cases" as holding that the Equal Protection Clause
"commands the elimination of racial barriers, not their creation in
39. Id. at 23.
40. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
[Vol. 50:459466
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order to satisfy our theory as to how society ought to be organized."4'
Stressing that the law school's selection process should be "racially
neutral, 42 he concluded that "whatever his race, [DeFunis] had a
constitutional right to have his application considered on its
individual merits in a racially neutral manner."43 One could not find a
more succinct description of the views underlying Croson and
Adarand.
One more aspect of the Warren Court's equal protection juris-
prudence deserves comment for its congruence with the more recent
cases. Again acting without precedent, the Court in Reynolds v.
Sins44 invalidated legislative apportionment schemes that failed to
treat all voters equally. Declaring that "[1]egislators represent people,
not trees or acres," 45 the Court demanded that legislative districts for
both state and congressional elections contain, as nearly as practic-
ably possible, equal populations. Any larger deviation was, the Court
noted, analogous to the racial gerrymandering condemned in
Gomillion.4 6 Racial gerrymandering thus served as the paradigm evil,
against which other apportionment schemes were judged.
In its "one-person, one-vote" cases, the Court seemed especially
hostile to districts constructed to represent particular interests. In
Reynolds the Court recognized that respecting conventional boundary
lines could justify some inequality because the alternative might pro-
duce a greater evil: "Indiscriminate districting, without any regard
for political subdivision or natural or historical boundary lines, may
be little more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering."47
Five years later, in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,48 the Court again stressed
the unconstitutionality of special interest districts. Missouri had
attempted to justify its unequal districts as "necessary to avoid frag-
menting areas with distinct economic and social interests and thereby
diluting the effective representation of those interests in Congress. 49
The Court rejected this claim, holding that "to accept population
variances, large or small, in order to create districts with specific
41. Id. at 342-43.
42. Id. at 334, 336.
43. Id. at 337.
44. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
45. Id. at 562.
46. Id. at 566.
47. Id. at 578-79.
48. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
49. Id. at 533.
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interest orientations is antithetical to the basic premise of the consti-
tutional command....
The current Court's affirmative action and redistricting cases
are thus direct descendants of the Warren Court's equal protection
jurisprudence. Affirmative action conflicts with the principle of
colorblindness and formal neutrality underlying most of the early
cases, and was, moreover, squarely rejected by the most liberal
member of the Warren Court. As for redistricting, two principles
stand out in the Warren Court's reapportionment cases:
gerrymandering of any sort is suspect, and gerrymandering to create
special interest districts is particularly invidious. Both of these
principles are consistent with-and indeed can be derived from-the
principle of neutrality announced in the race cases. And all three
principles support the current Court's rejection of overt, heavy-handed
racial gerrymandering. The Warren Court thus invalidated all types of
racial discrimination-including racial gerrymandering-and condemned
the creation of districts designed to enhance the voting power of
particular interest groups. Districts created solely to enhance the
voting power of a particular racial group would seem to fall into both
these disfavored categories.
B. Freedom of Speech
1. The Warren Court
The free speech jurisprudence of the Warren Court was the
culmination of the decades-long trend that began with Justice
Holmes's dissent in United States v. Abrams.51 The crux of that juris-
prudence is that the government may not suppress speech it does not
like. The earliest opinions expressing this basic principle, were voices
in the wilderness: Justice Holmes urged us to be "eternally vigilant
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe
and believe to be fraught with death,"52 and Justice Brandeis re-
minded us that those who founded our nation "eschewed silence co-
erced by law."53 As the century wore on, the principle gained
currency. Perhaps the most stirring invocation of the basic principle
comes from Justice Jackson's 1943 majority opinion in West Virginia
50. Id.
51. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
52. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
53. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
468 [Vol. 50:459
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State Board of Education v. Barnette:54 "If there is any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion .... ,5 But Barnette was only a temporary
recognition of the centrality of the prohibition against government
censorship. In 1951, the Vinson Court, with Justices Black and
Douglas in dissent, upheld Smith Act prosecutions of members of the
Communist Party despite the absence of any showing that the Party
presented a real threat.56 It was thus left to the Warren Court to
fulfill the promise of Barnette.
That Court began by immediately limiting Smith Act prosecu-
tions to those who knowingly and intentionally promote unlawful
action. Neither mere membership in the Party nor abstract advocacy
of the overthrow of the United States government, the Court ruled in
a trio of cases in 1957 and 1961, would suffice to permit prosecution.
57
Nevertheless, these cases did not yet unequivocally reflect the
Barnette principle. That step was taken in 1964, in a case that per-
haps best represents the Warren Court's commitment to the core
principle against government suppression of unpopular speech.
In New York Times v. Sullivan,58 the Court held that the First
Amendment shielded the newspaper from a libel suit for printing
falsehoods about a public official.59 While the specifics of the doctrine
are complicated-and still evolving-the underlying principle is clear
and simple. The First Amendment, according to Justice Brennan's
eloquent majority opinion, reflects "a profound national commitment
to the principles that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide open... ."60 This is so despite the fact that that
public debate "may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks... ."61 The Court explicitly recognized the
potential for abuse of speech rights and the view that the market-
place-of-ideas concept was "folly,"62 but it nevertheless chose to inter-
pret the First Amendment as a broad prohibition against government
censorship in all its forms. Justice Goldberg, writing in concurrence
54. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
55. Id. at 642.
56. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
57. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203
(1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
58. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
59. Id. at 264-66.





for himself and Justice Douglas, said it best: individuals "may not be
barred from speaking or publishing because those in control of gov-
ernment think that what is said or written is unwise, unfair, false, or
malicious."63
The Court reiterated this mistrust of government orthodoxy
again and again, rejecting attempts to censor speech that could not
firmly be shown to present a real danger. In 1969, the Court held
that even advocacy of violence or illegal conduct could not be prohib-
ited unless it was both "directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action" and "likely to produce such action."64 The Court's
solicitude for free speech sometimes outstripped the views of even its
most liberal members. Justice Black dissented from the holding, in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,65 that
students could not be punished for wearing black armbands to school.
Both Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas dissented in Street v.
New York,66 which reversed a conviction for casting contempt on the
American flag. The key principle in all these cases was an abhorrence
of government attempts to prescribe what ideas could and could not
be expressed.
The quintessential example of the Warren Court's adherence to
this principle came in a case decided two years after Chief Justice
Warren retired. In Cohen v. California,67 five stalwarts of the Warren
Court held that the government could not punish Paul Cohen for
wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft."68 The two new
Nixon appointees, Justice Blackmun and the new Chief, along with
Justices Black and White, dissented. Justice Harlan's matter-of-fact
majority opinion repeated once again the core principle of the First
Amendment: that provision, Harlan wrote, "is designed and intended
to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discus-
sion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely in
the hands of each of us .... ,,69 Despite instances of individual abuse,
despite the resulting "verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive ut-
terance," the First Amendment recognizes that "one man's vulgarity is
another man's lyric."70
63. Id. at 299 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
64. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
65. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
66. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
67. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
68. Id. at 26.
69. Id. at 24.
70. Id. at 24-25.
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And neither the Warren nor the Burger Court limited its hos-
tility to only the most glaring governmental intrusions on beliefs. As
Tinker, Cohen, and other cases indicate, the Court protected subtle as
well as straightforward expressions of belief. An unsophisticated
analysis might lead one to conclude that restrictions on the wearing of
an armband or the choice of one word rather than another do not
constitute government censorship of speech or ideas. But the Court
rejected such a simplistic conclusion, invalidating the restrictions at
issue. The Warren Court also recognized that the government vio-
lates the First Amendment when it uses its power of conferring bene-
fits in such a way as to coerce silence, holding that neither public
schools nor public universities could condition employment on an
individual's relinquishment of his first amendment rights. 1
By and large, the Burger Court continued and even extended
its predecessor's vigilance against government-prescribed orthodoxy.
From Warren Court holdings that the government could not prohibit
speech, the Burger Court derived the principle that the government
could not coerce speech either, asserting that the First Amendment
protects "both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from
speaking at all."72 Thus, the state of New Hampshire could not pun-
ish George and Maxine Maynard for refusing to display the motto
"Live Free or Die" on their license plates. Just as the Warren Court
defined "speech" to include conduct with a communicative focus, the
Burger Court in Buckley v. Valeo73 relied on Warren Court precedent
to include campaign expenditures within the definition of speech.
And in rejecting a proffered justification for government restrictions
on campaign expenditures, the Court echoed its predecessor's vision of
the First Amendment as both evenhanded and inclusive: "the concept
that the government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment .... 74 Although Buckley produced six
different opinions that ran 294 pages in the U.S. Reports, the section
that both contains the quoted statement and rejects limits on some
campaign expenditures 75 was joined by six of the eight participating
justices, including, from the Warren Court era, Justices Brennan,
71. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents of
the State of New York, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
72. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
73. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).




Stewart, and Marshall; only Justice White and Chief Justice Burger
dissented from this part of the opinion.
Principles often harden into doctrines and tests, and so did the
Warren Court's mistrust of government restrictions on speech. The
principle that the government cannot prescribe orthodoxy eventually
took the basic doctrinal form of insistence on "content-neutrality." The
Warren Court sowed the seeds for the content-neutrality doctrine in
1968, in United States v. O'Brien.76 In that case the Court held that
the government may regulate certain types of speech only if the
government interest underlying the regulation is "unrelated to the
suppression of free expression."77 The Court elaborated on this doc-
trine, rephrasing it in its current form, in Police Department of the
City of Chicago v. Mosley78 Justice Marshall's opinion in that 1972
case held that the government may not justify restrictions on speech
"by reference to content alone." 79 Under the "essence" of the First
Amendment, the government "may not grant the use of a forum to
people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing
to express less favored or more controversial views."80 This distinction
betwieen content-neutral regulations, which may sometimes be consti-
tutional, and content-based regulations, which almost never are, is
probably the most basic principle of modern free speech doctrine. And
despite its association with the Burger Court, its Warren Court heri-
tage is obvious.
This abbreviated romp through the Warren Court's free speech
jurisprudence is hardly novel. Every graduate of an American law
school-to say nothing of the constitutional law scholars who now
condemn the Supreme Court as conservative-is familiar with the
principles, cases, and doctrines I have mentioned. So why did I
bother repeating them? I bothered because they are directly relevant
to some of the most controversial cases decided by the current Court.
Keep the holdings, reasoning, and language of these precedents firmly
in mind as we turn to the free speech jurisprudence of the current
Court.
76. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
77. Id. at 377. O'Brien has had a peculiar history: the full four-part test has been
modified by subsequent cases. The test, originally applied to cases with both speech and non-
speech elements, or "symbolic speech," now probably applies instead to regulation of the time,
place, and manner of speech; and the case was probably wrongly decided and would be decided
differently today. Nevertheless, its core principle has been retained.
78. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
79. Id. at 96.
80. Id.
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2. The Current Court
The current Supreme Court has continued to adhere to the
Warren Court's basic principles of free speech. Indeed, in some in-
stances-such as commercial speech-it has expanded their applica-
tion. Overall, the Court has remained as steadfast as the Warren
Court in its insistence that the government has no power to prescribe
orthodoxy.
I begin with the two cases that have sparked the most contro-
versy. In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota,81 the Court invalidated
a St. Paul ordinance that banned hate speech. The ordinance penal-
ized anyone who engaged in specified types of symbolic speech that
caused "anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender."82 Justice Scalia, writing for a major-
ity of the Court, began his analysis by restating the two fundamental
principles of Warren Court free-speech jurisprudence: that
government may not suppress speech "because of disapproval of the
ideas expressed," and that "[c]ontent-based regulations are
presumptively invalid."8 3 And, indeed, the St. Paul ordinance is an
exemplary case of governmental proscription of speech based on
disapproval of the content. As Justice Scalia pointed out, the city had
singled out for special punishment only speech that communicates
"messages of racial, gender, or religious intolerance." 4 It is difficult to
imagine a clearer case of deliberate government censorship of speech
based on disagreement with the ideas it expresses. If the government
cannot ban the word "fuck" despite the fact that it offends, angers, or
alarms some hearers, then neither can it ban the cross-burning that
offends, angers, or alarms others. The only difference lies in the
identity of those offended.
Some academic commentators have tried to justify the St. Paul
ordinance and other similar restrictions on speech by suggesting that
hate speech "silences" its victims.8 5 Although Justice Scalia did not
address this argument, Buckley v. Valeo did. As even Justices
Brennan and Marshall recognized in that case, it is not constitutional
to silence some voices in order to enhance others. The difference
81. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
82. Id. at 380 (quoting the text of the statute).
83. Id. at 382.
84. Id. at 394.
85. See generally Mari J. Matsuda, et al., Words That Wound. Critical Race Theory,
Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment (Westview Press, 1993); Owen M. Fiss, The Irony
of Free Speech (Harvard U., 1996).
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between R.A. V. and earlier cases such as Cohen or Tinker is only that
we condemn the speech at issue in R.A. V. It always takes more integ-
rity to uphold freedom for speech we abhor, but the Court in R.A.V.
had that integrity.
The R.A. V. Court thus adhered unswervingly to the first
amendment principles established by the Warren Court. Indeed, one
might even argue that R.A.V. represents a Court that is more solici-
tous of speech than its predecessor. After all, although the Warren
Court recognized in Tinker that symbolic speech should also be pro-
tected by the First Amendment, it failed to live up to its own aspira-
tions when it allowed the government to ban the burning of draft
cards.86 The current Court recognizes more readily that igniting ob-
jects is an effective way of inflaming passions: in addition to its deci-
sion in R.A.V., it has invalidated two attempts to prohibit flag-burn-
ing.8 7
The current Court again angered some on the Left when it
upheld the right of parade organizers to exclude gay and lesbian
groups from marching.88 But as the Warren Court recognized, the
right to speak includes the right not to speak. To force the parade
organizers to communicate a gay rights message by including march-
ers carrying that message is exactly analogous to forcing the
Maynards to communicate "Live Free or Die" by carrying it on their
license plates. Again, the only significant difference between the two
cases is that current sympathies may lie with, rather than against,
the message the government is trying to encourage. The Warren
Court could not have put it better than Justice Souter did in his
unanimous opinion in Hurley: the government "is not free to interfere
with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message
or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose
may strike the government."89
The regulation of commercial speech provides another example
of continuity between the two Courts. Although the Warren Court
never explicitly confronted the question of commercial speech, Justice
Blackmun's 1976 opinion in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.90 resonated with Warren
Court precedent when it invalidated restrictions on advertising by
86. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 372.
87. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
88. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338,
132 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1995).
89. 115 S. Ct. at 2350.
90. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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pharmacists. The Court's two most recent cases on commercial
speech take a similarly expansive approach to protecting all types of
speech. In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Company,91 the Court unani-
mously invalidated a federal statute prohibiting malt liquor manufac-
turers from listing the alcohol content on the beverage's label. In 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,92 a fractured Court could not pro-
duce a majority opinion, but it nevertheless unanimously concluded
that Rhode Island could not prohibit price advertising by liquor
stores.
Numerous other, less politically controversial examples also
illustrate the current Court's adherence to the ideas of its predeces-
sor. Relying on Buckley v. Valeo, the Court last term struck down
federal laws attempting to limit campaign expenditures by political
parties.93 Only Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented. Expanding
Keyishian and Pickering, the Court also held last term that, as a gen-
eral rule, independent contractors' relationships with government
entities may not be severed because of their unpopular speech or their
party allegiance.94 On that issue, only Justices Scalia and Thomas
dissented. Thus the center of the Court seems firmly committed to
Warren Court precedent, with only sporadic and inconsistent dissents
from both political extremes.95
If content-neutrality and the avoidance of government censor-
ship of ideas or prescription of orthodoxy were the watchwords of the
Warren Court, they are equally central to the current Court. The
tenor of government orthodoxy, and thus of its regulation of speech,
may have changed, but the Court's resistance to it has not.
91. 115 S. Ct. 1585, 131 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1995).
92. 116 S. Ct. 1495, 134 L. Ed. 2d 711 (1996).
93. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission,
116 S. Ct. 2309, 135 L. Ed. 2d 795 (1996).
94. O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, 116 S. Ct. 2353, 135 L. Ed. 2d 874
(1996); Board of Commissioners, Wabaunsee County, Kansas v. Unbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342, 135 L.
Ed. 2d 843 (1996).
95. There is one glaring exception to the Rehnquist Court's acceptance of the principle
that government benefits may not be conditioned on the relinquishment of the right against
censorship. In Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), the Court failed to recognize the serious
first amendment issue raised by the government's insistence that entities receiving federal
funds not talk about abortion.
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III. MISSING THE OBVIOUS
A. Beyond Neutrality
If it can be so easily demonstrated that the current Court is
adhering to the principles and precedents of its predecessor, why is
the current Court so often criticized as conservative? Certainly that
label was never attached to the Warren Court, although I have just
suggested that both Courts followed the same course. Why is it that
we seem to need, as Justice Holmes once said, "education in the obvi-
ous"?96
I shall put aside immediately the fact that the current Court is
almost incontrovertibly more conservative than the Warren Court in
some areas peripheral to core constitutional law. For example, in the
law of federal jurisdiction, the current Court has overruled a number
of significant Warren Court precedents and has severely limited oth-
ers.9 7 The law of federal habeas corpus, in particular, has changed so
significantly as to be almost unrecognizable: what was once a fruitful
avenue for reviewing state court decisions has been almost entirely
closed off. In criminal procedure, too, although few major Warren
Court cases have been overruled, many have been so narrowly inter-
preted as to render them almost meaningless. But shifts to the right
in the law of federal jurisdiction or criminal procedure cannot explain
the widespread belief among constitutional law professors that the
Court is now more conservative. Specialization is now so complete
that few constitutional lawyers consider themselves also to be experts
in federal jurisdiction or criminal procedure. (I know of only one
prominent academic who writes in all three areas, and very few who
write in even two of the three.) Our collective judgment of conserva-
tism stems instead from the Court's rulings on such core constitu-
tional questions as equal protection and freedom of speech.
A more tempting, but still too simplistic, explanation is that it
is not the Court that has moved to the right but its critics who have
moved to the left. There is some evidence for this proposition. A
96. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law and the Court, in Harold Joseph Costin, Collected
Legal Papers 291, 292 (Harcourt Brace, 1920).
97. See, for example, Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (overruling most of Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (overruling the
remainder of Fay); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (narrowly construing the broad standing rules of
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) (reviving the long-
dormant barrier to de novo suits in federal court).
476 [Vol. 50:459
ALL THE COURT NEEDS TO KNOW
recent study finds conservatives in general, and Republicans in par-
ticular, underrepresented among law professors.98 Unfortunately, we
do not know whether they were equally underrepresented thirty years
ago. We may consider, additionally, the fact that a number of left-
wing schools of thought have arisen only since the end of the Warren
era: Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory, feminism, and
gaylegal studies. Nevertheless, without further data I am unwilling
to conclude that the change in attitude toward the Court is entirely or
even largely attributable to a change in the overt political leanings of
the academy.
But speculating that the current Court's "conservatism" is due
to a change in academic commentary rather than to a change in the
Court itself points us toward a more sophisticated explanation. I
suggest that what has changed is our attitude toward what might be
labelled evenhandedness or neutrality. Once thought the epitome of
enlightened jurisprudence, neutrality is no longer considered suffi-
cient as a basic principle. Neutrality (together with its cousin, objec-
tivity) is now considered a chimera, an illusion used by those in power
to justify and perpetuate existing hierarchies. It is the Court's failure
to accept the demise of neutrality as a meaningful concept that leads
many academics to label it conservative.
I should first make clear what I mean by "neutrality." I do not
mean anything so grand as Herbert Wechsler's "neutral principles."99
Unlike Wechsler, I do not care (for purposes of this argument) where
the principle comes from or how it is justified. I am merely describing
the principle that I believe animates the equal protection and free
speech jurisprudence of both Courts. That principle relies on the sort
of evenhandedness that is represented by Justice O'Connor's
insistence that "the standard of review under the Equal Protection
Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by
the particular classification."100 Similarly, neutrality demands that
the protections of the First Amendment be equally available to those
whose views we abhor and to those whose views we applaud. For
purposes of this Article, I need not go beyond this simple, formal
neutrality. The law must, on its face, treat all races with equal
solicitude and all views with equal tolerance. Whether or not we
agree with this principle, or consider the principle itself neutral, is
98. James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity (unpublished manuscript on file with the
Author).
99. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
100. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 494).
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irrelevant. All I am suggesting is that the demand that government
remain neutral in this limited sense provides the framework
underlying the jurisprudence of both the Warren Court and the
Rehnquist Court.
This limited neutrality principle, moreover, says nothing about
how society should choose its ultimate values. The long-ranging de-
bate between those who would have the government remain neutral
on individual value choices and those who would have the government
adopt policies that foster values such as autonomy is not implicated
by the principle I am describing. Demanding racial and content neu-
trality only prohibits certain means of achieving whatever goals the
government is legitimately permitted to adopt. Thus, whether or not
the government should be fostering individual autonomy, the Warren
Court's neutrality principle simply holds that it cannot do so by
means that discriminate on the basis of race, or that censor speech
according to its content.
The trend toward modern disenchantment with the previously
lauded concept of formal neutrality is easy to document. As the
Warren Court era began, many laws were decidedly non-neutral. The
Court's great achievement under the Equal Protection Clause was to
eliminate facially discriminatory laws by demanding that the law
remain formally neutral. Analogously, its first amendment jurispru-
dence systematically invalidated many non-neutral limits on freedom
of speech. Blacks and whites, Communists, Nazis, and patriots all
had equal claim to the protections of the Constitution. Neutrality
was, at that time, an enormous step forward.
But it was not a panacea. Lifting formal barriers to opportu-
nity did not immediately ensure equality of results. And so those who
considered themselves progressive began to demand different
remedies-remedies that would transgress the command of formal
neutrality. Some races are entitled to different treatment, and some
speech is proscribable because of its content. Formal neutrality fell
into disrepute, replaced by such ideas as substantive neutrality or
equality of results. Note that formal and substantive neutrality are
not merely gradations of neutrality, but are instead often in conflict:
to achieve substantive neutrality we may have to violate formal neu-
trality, as when we create different standards for admitting students
of different races in order to achieve some numerical parity.
The transformation in the academy can be illustrated by the
work of one of our foremost constitutional scholars. In 1970, John
Hart Ely suggested that the Equal Protection Clause meant "simply
that race shall not be employed as a criterion of selection for benefit
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or deprivation."10 1 Ely then defended the Court's disapproval of a
purposefully proportional system of jury selection in language that
resonates with the current Court's views:
[Tihe government's intentional and explicit use of race as a criterion of choice
is bound-no matter how careful the explanation that this is a 'good' use of
race-to weaken the educative force of its concurrent instruction that a man is
to be judged as a man, that his race has nothing to do with his merit.
0 2
He concluded that while "[c]olorblindness may in time turn out... to
be a less than absolute constitutional command," it is nevertheless
"constitutionally satisfactory" for "the foreseeable future."103 The fore-
seeable future did not last very long. By 1974, Ely was eloquently
defending affirmative action as ordinarily constitutional, reiterating
that view in his 1980 book. 104
I do not mean to cast aspersions on Professor Ely, whose work
I greatly admire and who inspired my own first article (defending
reduced scrutiny for reverse racial classifications). 0 5 His change of
heart is representative of the movement in the academy generally. As
principles of neutrality failed to produce desired results,
constitutional scholars began to question those principles.
These academic developments highlight one sense in which the
Rehnquist Court is justifiably thought more conservative than its
predecessor. Many of those who support affirmative action-that is,
proponents of some version of substantive equality-are trying to
extend the trendlines established by Warren Court precedent, in the
face of changed circumstances. What distinguishes the Rehnquist
Court is that it has refused to extend those trendlines and has instead
stopped with the precedents themselves. This may explain why we
think there is a difference between, say, Justice Scalia and Justice
Douglas, even if their opinions are virtually interchangeable. To the
extent that the current Court is conserving Warren Court precedents
rather than extending them, it is superficially conservative.
But I think it is misleading to label as conservative a defense
of formal neutrality. Formal neutrality-a colorblind society-is a
liberal aspiration insofar as it is derived from Enlightenment ideas
101. John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
Yale L. J. 1205, 1256 (1970).
102. Id. at 1259.
103. Id. at 1260.
104. John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 723 (1974); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard U., 1980).
105. Suzanna Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal Protection Context:
Democracy, Distrust, and Deconstruction, 73 Geo. L. J. 89 (1984).
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about merit and equality. In one sense, neither side in the debate
over affirmative action calls into question this liberal aspiration; the
dispute is instead only about the best means of achieving it. Take
merit standards for admission to law school, for example. Basing law
school admission primarily on numerical indicators of success such as
LSAT and undergraduate GPA disadvantages minority applicants.10 6
Scholars have thus argued for a long time that our commitment to




Similarly, some scholars have suggested that racist speech is so in-
imical to our aspirations of racial justice that it justifies a departure
from our ordinary reluctance to regulate speech on the basis of its
content.108 These are, in essence, arguments that the neutrality doc-
trines of the past are insufficient to eradicate racial discrimination in
the present, and thus that we ought to recognize exceptions in order
to achieve our ultimate goal of neutrality. But others with the same
goals and commitments might suggest that affirmative action or hate
speech regulations undermine rather than serve those goals. Thus
good liberals can and do disagree about whether the proponents of
affirmative action or hate speech regulations have made a persuasive
case for deviation from liberal ideals. Deprecating as "conservative"
those who are not persuaded-whether on or off the Court-does not
help us resolve the difficult issues raised by affimative action and
hate speech regulation. If the ACLU is conservative because it op-
poses hate speech regulations, where does that leave Robert Bork,
who believes that almost any governmental interest will suffice to
justify censorship? 0 9 If those who oppose affirmative action as race
discrimination are conservative, then what is Richard Epstein, who
thinks that all anti-discrimination laws should be repealed? 10
106. One study reports that the median LSAT score for whites is the 65th percentile, for
Mexican Americans it is the 30th percentile, and for blacks it is the 22nd percentile. Lino A.
Graglia, Hopwood v. Texas: Racial Preferences in Higher Education Upheld and Endorsed, 45 J.
Legal Educ. 79, 82 (1995).
107. See, for example, Randall L. Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the
Affirmative Action Debate, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1327, 1331 n.15 (1986) (advocating an affirmative
action program that "require[s] the satisfaction of certain minimal requirements appropriate to
a given context' and allowing "the minority status of an applicant... [to) play a legitimate role
in hiring or admission decisions" once these requirements have been met).
108. See, for example, Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320, 2357 (1989) (arguing that racist speech should be treated
as a sui generis category of speech outside the realm of protected discourse).
109. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L. J.
1 (1971); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 126-28
(Collier Macmillan, 1990).
110. See generally Richard Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment
Discrimination Laws (Harvard U., 1992).
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Thus one purpose of my comparison between the Warren and
Rehnquist Courts is to suggest that to the extent that charges of con-
servatism stem from disagreement over means, those charges are
unfair and counterproductive. The debate about whether temporary
deviations from principles of racial neutrality are necessary or detri-
mental does not call into question the basic aspiration toward color-
blindness and formal neutrality itself. To the many scholars who
defend affirmative action in these traditional terms, I say only that
they should not allow the debate to degenerate into the sort of name-
calling that has become all too prevalent.
But some claims that the Rehnquist Court is conservative stem
from another source entirely. If we remain committed to
Enlightenment ideals, the case for even partial exceptions to princi-
ples of formal neutrality is a difficult one, as proponents have found.
However clever or sophisticated the arguments, they are met with
skepticism because of the intuitive appeal of formal equality.
The title of this Article is taken from Robert Fulghum's book,
All I Really Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten. His title essay
contains a list of the things he learned, including play fair, clean up
your own mess, and don't take things that aren't yours. These
fundamentals reflect our liberal attachment to individualism and
formal neutrality. Americans tend to believe that "playing fair"
means making everyone play by the same rules, and any deviation
from this definition is immediately suspect. This is not to suggest
that proponents of affirmative action are necessarily wrong, just that
they have the more challenging side of the argument. Within the
Enlightenment tradition, the high moral ground seems to belong to
those who favor formal neutrality. Even though the simplest answer
is not always the best one, it is often the most marketable.
Recognizing the inherent difficulty of explaining why substan-
tive neutrality should displace formal neutrality-that is, why the
government should vary the rules according to perceived need, thus
formally disadvantaging some people in order to give others substan-
tive equality-some opponents of formal neutrality have begun to
take another approach. While many scholars, including Ely, have
continued to defend affirmative action (or, in some cases, hate speech
regulations), with the traditional liberal arguments, others have
taken a more radical turn. These newer scholars have begun to at-
tack the idea of neutrality altogether. It has become fashionable to
assert that doctrines of neutrality are not simply ineffective in com-




It is this turn in the debate that explains much of the vehe-
mence with which the charges of conservatism are levelled. And it is
this turn in the debate that I find especially troubling. On this view,
the condemnation of the current Court as conservative goes deeper
than a mere disagreement about how best to implement our commit-
ment to a liberal democratic polity. It stems from a rejection of the
traditional liberal Enlightenment ideal of objectivity. According to
the scholars who embrace this view-commonly called postmodernists
or social constructivists-any standard that purports to be neutral or
objective is simply a mask for the desires of the powerful elites in
society. Thus, all "normative orderings.., reflect the views of the
powerful,"'M and all "[s]tandards are nothing more than structured
preferences" of the powerful.12  Objective reality is "a myth,"'13 and
objectivity "is only a cover for a male viewpoint."" 4 Merit standards,
in particular, are not neutral, but are deliberately constructed to favor
those in power: merit is "not merely contingent, it is racially bi-
ased,"" 5 and reflects "what white men value about themselves."16
In the minds of more traditional proponents of affirmative
action, neutrality is a useful tool that is sometimes inadequate to the
task at hand, and thus occasionally needs to be supplemented or re-
placed. The postmodernists, on the other hand, also view neutrality
as a tool, but one which quite effectively serves its intended purpose
of perpetuating white male dominance.
Similarly, the core principle of content-neutrality in speech
regulation is merely a cover for selective censorship. Decisions about
which speech is protected by the First Amendment do not turn on
principle, but on "the ability of some persons to inter-
pret-recharacterize or rewrite-principle and doctrine in ways that
lead to the protection of speech they want heard... and the regula-
111. Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in
Legal Thought, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 933, 951 (1991).
112. Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a Law Professor 103
(Harvard U., 1991).
113. Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence, 95 Yale L. J. 1373, 1378
(1986).
114. A.W. Phinney III, Feminism, Epistemology and the Rhetoric of Law: Reading Bowen
v. Gilliard, 12 Harv. Women's L. J. 151, 176 (1989).
115. Robert L. Hayman, Jr., and Nancy Levit, The Tales of White Folk- Doctrine,
Narrative, and the Reconstruction of Racial Reality, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 377, 403 (1996).
116. Catharine A. Macannon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 Yale L. J. 1281,
1291 (1991).
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tion of speech they want silenced."" 7 Again, neutrality is merely an
illusion that serves the interests of those currently in power.
Moving beyond the pragmatic debate about whether depar-
tures from neutrality are justified, then, some scholars have aban-
doned the fundamental aspiration toward racial or content neutrality
in government. This change explains the condemnation of the current
Supreme Court: its adherence to principles of neutrality places it
squarely among those committed to perpetuating existing hierarchies
of power. A few of the social constructivists go so far as to condemn
the Warren Court in retrospect-Derrick Bell, for example, suggests
that Brown v. Board of Education was actually decided the way it was
only because it served the interests of the white majority. 118 But for
most critics of the Supreme Court, the Warren Court remains a
beacon of progressive wisdom. The difference between the doctrines
of the two Courts lies in their effects: in the 1960s, principles of
neutrality served the substantive goals that these principles are
thought to hinder today. For the social constructivists, that difference
is enough to demonstrate the conservatism of the current Court.
B. Back to the Future
One last item remains. I have shown that the same principles
underlie the core constitutional jurisprudence of both the Rehnquist
and Warren Courts. I have suggested that the widespread belief that
the latter is more conservative than the former (at least in these two
areas) is either unfair or stems from the postmodern critique of
objectivity. What, if anything, is wrong with the postmodern view?
Perhaps we should, as the postmodernists suggest, move- beyond
Enlightenment ideals, recognize the pervasive effects of power, and
abandon even the aspiration of objectivity and neutrality.
If we did that, though, our future would look too much like our
(distant) past. It is necessarily a return to pre-Enlightenment re-
gimes. If neutrality and other objective standards cannot mediate
among competing claims to truth and justice, then we return to a
cultural version of the religious wars of earlier centuries. Indeed, the
similarities between the pre-Enlightenment religious world view and
the world view of radical social constructivists is apparent in the
claim by one scholar that "[t]he allocation of creationism to the mar-
117. Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech and It's a Good Thing Too 110
(Oxford U., 1994).
118. Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 Conn. L. Rev. 363 (1992).
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ginalized world of subjectivity, and evolution to the privileged world of
objectivity, is merely the exercise of social power rather than a natu-
ral, value-neutral distinction."1S Substitute "racial balance" and
"merit standards" for "creationism" and "evolution," respectively, and
you have a statement that might be endorsed by any social construc-
tivist. Many of the social constructivists do not conceal their distaste
for Enlightenment ideals: one suggests that "enlightenment-style
Western democracy" is "the source of black people's subordination"
because "racism and enlightenment are the same thing."10
As I have written elsewhere on the dangers of the critique of
objectivity and the abandonment of the Enlightenment tradition,
121 I
will offer only brief arguments here. One of the greatest achieve-
ments of the Enlightenment was to uncouple claims to truth from the
institutional, religious, or hereditary affiliations of those who made
them. As Justice Frankfurter said in a slightly different context, the
Enlightenment concept of a meritocracy made "your father or your
face equally irrelevant," in determining one's status and one's contri-
bution, all that mattered was "scholarship and character, objectively
ascertained."1 22 To abandon that aspiration is to return to a world in
which it matters not what is said, but who says it.
It is an American tragedy that, inspired to nationhood by the
Enlightenment, we nevertheless failed to implement its basic princi-
ples. The Warren Court's adoption of principles of neutrality began to
rectify that great lapse. We can argue about whether more needs to
be done-whether the centuries when pedigree did eclipse merit can
be so easily erased-but we should not revert to the pre-
Enlightenment principles themselves. By denying that neutrality is
possible, we give up any hope for a society in which people are judged
"not by the color of their skin but by the content of their character."'123
There are even greater dangers to the abandonment of neutral-
ity. Without neutrality as a guiding principle, there is no way to
119. Frederick M. Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 Va. L. Rev. 671, 686
(1992).
120. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Seventh Chronicle: Race, Democracy, and the State, 41
UCLA L. Rev. 720, 729 (1994).
121. See Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, Beyond All Reason (forthcoming, Oxford
U., 1997); Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 Geo. L. J. 453 (1996); Suzanna Sherry,
Enlightening the Religion Clauses, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 473 (1996).
122. Quoted in Felix Frankfurter, the Old Boy Network, and the New Deal: The Placement
of Lawyers in Public Service in the 1930s, in G. Edward White, Intervention and Detachment.
Essays in Legal History and Jurisprudence 149, 154-55 (Oxford U., 1994).
123. Martin Luther King, Jr., Aug. 28, 1963, Washington D.C., reprinted in Coretta Scott
King, ed., The Martin Luther King, Jr., Companion: Quotations from the Speeches, Essays, and
Books of Martin Luther King, Jr. 101 (St. Martin's Press, 1994).
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justify or defend any particular allocation of society's goods and bene-
fits (such as law school placement). How are we to define fair
allocations if not by reference to neutral standards such as merit? If
we try to define fairness by outcome, suggesting that racial and ethnic
groups should be roughly proportionately represented among the
advantaged of our society, what shall we do about Jews, who, at 3% of
the American population, constitute 26% of the law professoriate, 40%
of the wealthiest 40 Americans, and 40% of the American Nobel Prize
winners in science and economics? 24 If we try to define fairness in
procedural terms, how will we define fair procedures if neutrality is
ruled out as a yardstick?
The advantage of the Enlightenment is that it gives us an an-
swer to these questions. Fairness presumptively requires racial neu-
trality, and deviations are allowed only if we are persuaded that, in a
particular situation and for openly-discussed reasons, principles of
neutrality are substantively unfair. That is the case that traditional
defenders of affirmative action have always made, and should con-
tinue making. But making such a case is no less necessary because it
is difficult, or because a facile claim that neutral, objective standards
cannot exist is superficially more attractive.
IV. CONCLUSION
Philosophers Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson have re-
cently published a wonderful book suggesting that the best way for
citizens in a heterogenous democracy to coexist peacefully is to abide
by a certain framework for deliberating through their disagree-
ments. 25 That way, even where some moral disagreement remains,
all members of the society can (we hope) accept whatever resolution
the majority ultimately reaches. Rather than prescribing appropriate
results, Gutmann and Thompson provide a framework for moral and
political deliberation. One of their fundamental principles is "mutual
respect": mutual respect "requires a favorable attitude toward, and
124. James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity (unpublished manuscript on file with Author);
Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, Jews and the New American Scene 26-27 (Harvard U.,
1995) (wealth and Nobel prizes). See also Robert Burt, Two Jewish Justices: Outcasts in the
Promised Land 64 (U. of California, 1988); Charles E. Silberman, A Certain People: American
Jews and Their Lives Today 99 (Summit Books, 1985); Gerald Krefetz, Jews and Money; The
Myths and the Reality (Ticknor and Fields, 1982).




constructive interaction with, the persons with whom one dis-
agrees."126
This Article follows their lead. I do not try to resolve the dis-
putes about affirmative action and hate speech, but only to suggest
the form that the disputes should and should not legitimately take.
Disagreement over the best way to achieve common goals should not
degenerate into political name-calling. And to the extent that the
debate actually focuses on goals, and calls into question the appropri-
ateness of the aspirations of the Enlightenment, my Article offers a
word of warning. The critics who take a postmodern approach that
makes the Enlightenment itself conservative should be aware of the
dangers. Those who currently lack power are likely to be better off in
a world of objective standards than in a postmodern world, where
objectivity is replaced by power.
126. Id. at 79.
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